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Abstract: 
Context: Critical systems in domains such as aviation, railway, and automotive are often subject to a 
formal process of safety certification. The goal of this process is to ensure that these systems will 
operate safely without posing undue risks to the user, the public, or the environment. Safety is typically 
ensured via complying with safety standards. Demonstrating compliance to these standards involves 
providing evidence to show that the safety criteria of the standards are met. 
Objective: In order to cope with the complexity of large critical systems and subsequently the plethora 
of evidence information required for achieving compliance, safety professionals need in-depth 
knowledge to assist them in classifying different types of evidence, and in structuring and assessing the 
evidence. This paper is a step towards developing such a body of knowledge that is derived from a large-
scale empirically rigorous literature review. 
Method: We use a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) as the basis for our work. The SLR builds on 
218 peer-reviewed studies, selected through a multi-stage process, from 4,963 studies published between 
1990 and 2012.  
Results: We develop a taxonomy that classifies the information and artefacts considered as evidence for 
safety. We review the existing techniques for safety evidence structuring and assessment, and further 
study the relevant challenges that have been the target of investigation in the academic literature. We 
analyse commonalities in the results among different application domains and discuss implications of 
the results for both research and practice. 
Conclusion: The paper is, to our knowledge, the largest existing study on the topic of safety evidence. 
The results are particularly relevant to practitioners seeking a better grasp on evidence requirements as 
well as to researchers in the area of system safety. As a major finding of the review, the results strongly 
suggest the need for more practitioner-oriented and industry-driven empirical studies in the area of 
safety certification. 
Keywords: safety-critical systems; safety standards; safety compliance; safety certification; safety 
evidence; systematic literature review. 
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Abbreviations: 
 
AADL Architecture Analysis & Design Language 
ACRuDA Assessment and Certification Rules for Digital Architectures 
ASA Automated and Structured Analysis 
ASCAD Adelard Safety Case Development 
BBN Bayesian Belief Networks 
CAE Claims, Arguments and Evidence 
CCS Calculus of Communicating Systems 
CDL Configuration Deviation List 
CENELEC Comité  Européen  de  Normalisation  Electrotechnique   (European Committee for  
Electrotechnical Standardization) 
CMA Common Mode Analysis 
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
CSP Communicating Sequential Processes 
DECOS Dependable Embedded COmponents and Systems 
DOVE Design Oriented Verification and Evaluation 
ECHA Environmental Condition Hazard Assessment 
EMFI Electromagnetic Fault Injection 
ETA Event Tree Analysis 
EVA Evidence Volume Approach 
FFA Functional Failure Analysis 
FFPA Functional Failure Patch Analysis 
FHA 
FMEA 
Functional Hazard Analysis 
Failure Mode, Effects Analysis 
FMECA Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
FMEDA Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Coverage Analysis 
FMES Failure Mode and Effect Summary 
FPGA Field-programmable gate array 
FPTC Fault Propagation and Transformation Calculus 
FPTN Failure Propagation and Transformation Notation 
FSM Functional Safety Management 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
GQM Goal Question Metric 
GSN Goal Structuring Notation 
HAZID Hazard Identification Study 
HAZOP HAZard and Operability 
HEP Human Error Prediction 
HHA Human Hazard Analysis 
HOL Higher Order Logic 
HRA Human Reliability Analysis 
IEC International Electro-technical Commission 
IET Institution of Engineering and Technology 
IHA Intrinsic Hazard Analysis 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
MDE Model-Driven Engineering 
MC/DC Modified Condition/Decision Coverage 
MMEL Master Minimum Equipment List 
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures 
MTTF Mean Time To Failure 
OCL Object Constraint Language 
OS Operating System 
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
PRA 
PS 
Particular Risk Analysis 
Primary Study 
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PSAC Plan for Software Aspects of Certification 
QA Quality Assurance 
RASP Risk Assessment of Structural Part 
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
RTOS Real-Time OS 
SACM Structured Assurance Case Metamodel 
SAL Safety Assurance Level 
SAS Software Accomplishment Summary 
SCMP Software Configuration Management Plan 
SDP Software Development Plan 
SEAL Safety Evidence Assurance Level 
SHARD Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design 
SIL Safety Integrity Level  
SLR Systematic Literature Review 
SQA Software QA 
SRS Software Requirements Specification 
SSG Safety Specification Graph 
SVP Software Verification Plan 
SWIFI Software Implemented Fault Injection 
TPTP Thousands of Problems for Theorem Provers 
UAS Unmanned Autonomous Systems  
V&V Verification and Validation 
  
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
A safety-critical system is one whose failure may cause death or injury to people, harm to the 
environment, or substantial economic loss [5]. In domains such as aviation, railway, and automotive, such 
systems are typically subject to a rigorous safety assessment process. A common type of assessment, 
usually conducted by a licensing or regulatory body, is safety certification. The goal of safety certification 
is to provide a formal assurance that a system will function safely in the presence of known hazards 
[PS93]. Safety certification can be associated with the assessment of products, processes, or personnel. 
For software-intensive safety-critical systems, certification of products and processes are regarded as 
being the most challenging [PS93].   
Assessing and assuring safety of a system relies on building sufficient confidence in the safe operation 
of the system in its operating context. This confidence is often developed by satisfying safety objectives 
that mitigate the potential safety risks that a system can pose during its lifecycle. The safety objectives are 
usually established by a set of industry-accepted criteria, typically available as standards. Examples of 
safety standards include IEC61508 [11] for a broad class of programmable electronic systems, DO-178C 
[7] for aviation, the CENELEC standards (e.g., [33]) for railway, and ISO26262 [8] for the automotive 
sector. 
Demonstrating compliance with safety standards involves collecting evidence that shows that the 
relevant safety criteria in the standards are met [16]. Although, safety standards prescribe the procedures 
for compliance, it often proves to be a very challenging task to the system suppliers due to the fact that 
these standards are presented in very large textual documents that are subject to interpretation. In general, 
evidence can be defined as “The  available  body  of facts or information indicating whether a belief or 
proposition   is   true  or   valid” [30]. For realistically large systems, however, one can seldom argue that 
evidence serves as a definitive proof of the truth or validity of safety claims, but only whether the 
evidence is sufficient for building (adequate) confidence in the claims. Hence, we define evidence for 
safety certification as “information   or   artefacts   that   contribute   to   developing   confidence   in   the   safe  
operation of a system and to showing the fulfilment of the requirements of one or more safety standards”. 
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Some generic examples of safety evidence are test results, system specifications, and personnel 
competence. 
The lack of consistent interpretation of a standard can lead to misunderstanding the evidence needs.  
Failing to clearly understand the evidence needs for assessing a system can result in two main problems 
[34][PS145]. First, the supplier may fail to record critical details during system development that the 
certifier will require later on. Building the missing evidence after-the-fact can be both expensive and 
laborious. Second, not knowing ahead of time what the certifiers will receive as evidence may affect the 
planning and organisation of the certification activities. In particular, the certifier may find it hard to 
develop sufficient confidence in the system undergoing certification if the evidence requirements have 
not been negotiated and agreed with the supplier a priori [PS54][15].  
Apart from understanding and precisely defining the evidence requirements, attention needs to be paid 
to how this evidence is organised and assessed for adequacy. If the evidence is not structured properly, its 
sheer volume and complexity can jeopardize the clarity of the safety arguments [PS124]. Furthermore, it 
is important to be able to determine how definitive and credible the evidence is. Though safety standards 
mandate adequate evidence to show compliance, they are vague on what adequate means in a particular 
context, often intentionally and for the sake of being general. 
The main objective of this paper is to synthesise the existing knowledge in the academic literature 
about safety evidence, concentrating on the three facets outlined above: the information that constitutes 
evidence; structuring of evidence; and evidence assessment. The term evidence provision is used 
hereafter to collectively refer to these three facets. Alongside, we analyse the challenges and needs in 
safety evidence provision and perform a domain analysis [15] to identify the commonalities among 
different application domains for this purpose. 
We achieve our objective by means of a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) – a documented and 
repeatable process through which the literature on a given subject is examined and the current state of 
knowledge is recorded [18]. The main advantage of a SLR, when compared to ad hoc search, is that it 
provides a higher degree of confidence about covering the relevant literature and thus minimises 
subjectivity and bias. 
Our SLR draws on 218 peer-reviewed publications, selected out of 4873, through a multi-stage 
process. A key feature of the review is that it does not restrict itself to a particular domain or safety 
standard. This broad scope in the search gives us deeper insights on the state of the art. Additionally, the 
breadth helps in understanding the commonalities among the different domains in terms of how evidence 
is perceived, structured and assessed, in turn enabling improvements in the domains that do not yet 
enforce stringent certification requirements, e.g., the automotive sector.  
As part of our work, we classify into a hierarchical taxonomy the various information and artefacts 
considered as evidence for compliance with safety standards. The taxonomy includes 49 basic evidence 
types and is, to our knowledge, the most comprehensive classification of safety evidence built to date. 
This taxonomy is a good reference for understanding and further elaborating the evidence requirements 
for specific standards and specific systems. The other outcomes of the SLR, namely the survey of 
approaches for evidence structuring and assessment, the overview of challenges and needs, and a domain 
analysis to identify commonalities, will be a useful guide for developing a detailed map of the field and 
for defining a future research agenda on safety certification. Our study notably indicates that a large 
majority of the approaches surveyed have not been validated in realistic settings and thus provide little 
information about their practical utility. An important recommendation for future research on safety 
certification is therefore for the research to be more rigorous from an empirical standpoint and more 
oriented towards industry needs. 
The SLR has been conducted as part of OPENCOSS [25], which is a large-scale European research 
project on safety certification in the railway, aviation and automotive domains. The work we present here 
extends an earlier conference paper [21]. The main extensions are: (1) the addition of a new data source, 
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namely Google Scholar, thereby increasing the number of primary studies; (2) significant expansion of 
the description of the research method and the results; and (3) our domain analysis (mentioned above). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 describes the 
research method used. Section 4 presents the SLR results. Section 5 discusses the implications of these 
results on research and practice. Section 6 discusses the threats to validity of the review. Finally, Section 
7 presents our conclusions and future work. 
2 RELATED WORK 
Several papers discuss the notion of evidence in specific situations and how this evidence can be 
structured and assessed. We do not treat these as related work but rather as the primary studies for our 
SLR. The discussions in this section are therefore targeted at contrasting our work with the more generic 
classifications of safety evidence as well as the relevant existing SLRs. 
Some threads in previous work, e.g. [PS121], address the problem of safety evidence classification 
through focusing on safety standards such as IEC61508. Further threads, e.g. [17], consider the 
structuring of evidence for safety cases. A safety case is a structured argument aimed at providing a 
compelling, comprehensive, and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given 
operating environment [19]. The arguments in a safety case are always accompanied by evidence 
supporting the arguments. More recently, there has been an OMG initiative called SACM aimed at 
standardizing the notion of and the concepts related to assurance evidence and arguments [24].  While the 
above threads have been a useful start for the current SLR, they are either too specific (relating to only 
one standard or application domain) or do not provide a thorough and sufficiently detailed analysis of the 
possible evidence types and how to structure and assess them. 
There are a number of SLRs in the literature whose scope partially overlaps with ours, e.g., on testing 
[2], on requirements specification [22], and on reliability [37]. None of these specifically address the 
topic of evidence for safety. Some past work attempts to compare safety standards in different domains 
with the aim of identifying the commonalities and differences among them [12][3][34]. However, these 
comparisons are limited in scope and, in contrast to ours, are not based on a systematic review.   
In summary, little has been done to date by way of synthesising and summarising, in a comprehensive 
manner, the state of the art on safety evidence. Consequently, no unifying framework exists for reasoning 
about and communicating safety evidence. This observation led us to the need for the SLR as a way to 
gain new insights into how to specify, structure and assess safety evidence.  
3 RESEARCH METHOD 
A SLR is a means of identifying, evaluating and interpreting available research relevant to a particular 
research question or topic area [18]. Individual studies contributing to a systematic review are called 
primary studies. A systematic review is a form of secondary study.  
The purpose of a SLR is three-fold [18]: 
 To present a fair evaluation of a research topic by means of a rigorous and systematic 
methodology. 
 To help in identifying any gaps in the current research in order to suggest further 
improvements. 
 To summarise and provide background for new research activities.  
The design of the SLR reported in this paper started in October 2011. After several refinements and 
improvements, publication search was started in January 2012.  
The following subsections present the research questions, the data sources, search strategies, the 
publication selection, and the quality criteria of the SLR. 
3.1 Research Questions 
We formulated the following research questions (RQs) 
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RQ1. What information constitutes evidence of compliance with safety standards? 
The aim of this question is to identify the various pieces of information such as artefacts, tool 
outcomes, and techniques considered as or used to provide evidence about the safety of a system during 
certification. The results are used to develop an evidence classification. 
 
RQ2. What techniques are used for structuring evidence to show compliance with safety 
standards? 
The aim of this question is to determine how the evidence collected during the various stages of a 
system’s lifecycle can be structured and presented in a suitable way to demonstrate compliance with a 
safety standard.   
 
RQ3. What techniques are used for assessing the adequacy of evidence?  
The aim of this question is to determine how the evidence collected can be assessed for adequacy and 
for gaining confidence that it satisfies the safety requirements of a standard, and thereby confidence in the 
overall safety of a system. 
 
RQ4. What challenges and needs have been the target of investigation in relation to safety 
evidence?  
The aim of this question is to identify the various challenges addressed in the literature regarding the 
provision of evidence for safety certification. The results obtained will be useful to identify emerging 
trends and provide an overall view of the problems tackled in the literature. 
 
RQ5. What commonalities exist among different application domains with regards to RQ1-
RQ4? 
The aim of this question is to identify, through a domain analysis, the similarities that exist among 
different application domains in terms of safety evidence provision. This research question is particularly 
relevant to practitioners who are engaged in cross-domain certification of components used across 
multiple application domains, or in assessing the feasibility of product reuse from domains other than that 
of the application they are working on. 
3.2 Source Selection 
We performed two types of search to find publications relevant to the scope of the review. The first 
type was an automatic search performed on the following publishers’ databases: ACM (portal.acm.org), 
IEEE (ieeexplore.ieee.org), Springer (springerlink.com), Elsevier (sciencedirect.com), and Wiley 
(onlinelibrary.wiley.com). We also used Google Scholar (scholar.google.com).  
The second type was a manual search on the following workshops, conference, and journals: 
Australian Workshop on Safety Critical Systems and Software, High-Assurance Systems Engineering 
(HASE), IET System Safety, International Symposium On Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods, 
Verification and Validation (ISoLA), International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering 
(ISSRE), International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security (SAFECOMP), Safety 
Critical System Symposium, Reliability Engineering & System Safety, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 
and IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering. These venues correspond to conferences, workshops, 
and journals in which we repeatedly found, during our pilot automatic searches, publications that were 
relevant to the SLR. The decision about which venues to consider for manual search was made based on 
the   authors’   collective   observations   during   the   pilot   searches,   while   we   were   elaborating   the   search  
strategy and before the search string was finalized. We did not consider satellite workshops at the 
conferences we manually searched. 
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In addition, expert knowledge was used for publication selection. We included relevant publications of 
which the authors were aware either on their own or because of having been informed by a colleague, but 
that had not been identified through the automated and manual searches. These were mainly studies that 
were accepted for publication but not yet available from the publishers when the automatic search was 
performed. In either case, publications added through expert knowledge were subject to passing the same 
inclusion criteria applied to automatic and manual searches. 
 
3.3 Search String 
We developed the search string by specifying the main terms of the phenomena under investigation. A 
number of pilot searches were performed to refine the keywords in the search string using trial and error. 
We removed terms whose inclusion did not yield additional papers in the automatic searches. After 
several iterations, we settled on the following search string. This search string, which is expressed as a 
conjunction of three parts, was used to search within keywords, title, abstract and full text of the 
publications†: 
 
[part I] 
("critical software" OR "critical system" OR "critical equipment" OR "critical application" OR 
"embedded system" OR "embedded software") 
 
 AND 
 
[part II] 
("safety certification" OR "safety evaluation" OR "safety assurance" OR "safety assessment" OR 
"safety qualification" OR "safety analysis" OR "safety standard" OR "safety requirement")  
 
AND 
 
[part III]  
(evidence OR "safety case" OR "safety argument" OR "assurance case" OR "dependability case") 
 
The first part of the search string captures keywords related to safety-critical systems. The second part 
concerns safety certification. Here, we consider several keywords in addition to “safety certification”. 
These additional keywords capture terms that are sometimes used interchangeably with certification (e.g., 
safety evaluation), activities that share the same underlying principles as certification (e.g., qualification), 
and elements that serve as the main prerequisites to certification (safety standards and safety 
requirements). The third and final part of the search string relates to safety evidence. Here, we further 
consider an important context, namely safety cases and arguments, where safety evidence regularly 
appear without necessarily making a reference to the  term  “evidence”. To this end and in line with what 
we observed in our pilot searches, we consider the fact that many papers have used the broader notions of 
assurance case and dependability case as synonyms for safety case, although these broader notions refer 
not only to safety but also to other dependability criteria such as security and reliability [16].   
                                                 
† Where  applicable,  plural  forms  of  the  keywords  were  added  to  the  queries  performed  over  the  publishers’  databases.  These  
plural forms are not shown in the search string to avoid clutter. In the case of SpringerLink and Google Scholar, where the 
search string was too long for the search engines, we performed the search through several sub-strings (12 sub-strings for 
SpringerLink and 21 sub-strings for Google Scholar). 
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3.4 Study Selection Strategy and Inclusion Criteria 
We specified inclusion and exclusion criteria for selecting primary studies. The basic inclusion 
criterion was to identify and select peer-reviewed studies related to safety assessment or certification of 
computer-based critical systems that dealt with safety evidence for showing compliance with safety 
standards. We searched and included publications written in English that provided information, artefacts, 
tool outcomes, or techniques considered as evidence for safety certification. When performing the manual 
search, we considered only those studies that had not been identified in the automatic search. In the 
journals, we only considered volumes from 1990 until the date when the automatic and manual searches 
were performed (January 2012). This was the publication year of the oldest paper found with automatic 
search and with manual search of conferences and workshops.  
We also applied the following exclusion criteria, filtering out publications that matched any of the 
criteria: 
 Grey literature, e.g., technical reports, working papers, project deliverables, and PhD theses 
 Books, tutorials or poster publications 
 Publications that addressed generic safety analysis techniques (e.g., FTA) but did not address 
provision of evidence for safety certification 
 Papers in the context of non-computer based critical systems 
 Publications whose text was not available 
 
Study selection was performed through two main processes. The first process, reported in [21], 
covered all the sources (Section 3.2) except Google Scholar. In the second process, Google Scholar was 
considered as well as some new papers identified through expert knowledge.  
The first process consisted of four phases. These phases are shown in Table I (represented as P1, P2, 
P3 and P4 in the table). In Phase 1, we applied the search string to the electronic databases, and a total of 
2,200 results were retrieved. In Phase 2, the first author read the abstract of the retrieved publications to 
determine their relevance to the scope of the SLR. The basic selection criterion at this stage was to check 
if the abstracts referred to safety evidence information for assessment or certification purposes or 
included the word evidence or some way to specify evidence (safety, assurance, or dependability case, or 
safety argument). During this phase, the first author also performed the manual searches on the selected 
conferences and journals. The same selection criteria as above were used for manual searches. From the 
2,200 studies obtained in the automatic search, 151 publications were selected. Performing the manual 
search resulted in the selection of 65 studies, making a total of 216 individual studies for the next phase.  
In Phase 3, the studies were reviewed in depth.  The workload was divided among the authors, with the 
first author being responsible for reviewing most of the studies. The remaining authors helped and 
provided guidance. No evidence information was initially found in 56 studies and these were excluded 
from the review. 
In Phase 4, the second author performed two reliability checks. First, he randomly checked 
approximately 10% of the studies of Phase 1 by reading the abstract. Second, he inspected all the 56 
papers excluded in Phase 3. At this stage, we regarded duplicates as those papers with at least one author 
in common that provide equivalent answers to the research questions (e.g., an extended version of a 
previous paper). In all cases, the extended and most recent version of the paper was included to extract 
maximum information. Excluded work considered to be potentially relevant was brought up for 
discussion and reviewed again. As shown in Table I, eight studies were added as a result of the discussion 
and the relevant data was extracted from them. In addition, four studies were removed as a result of 
duplication. At this stage, seven papers were also added based on expert knowledge. These are studies 
that the authors considered to be relevant to the review and were not previously captured in any of the 
automatic or manual searches. The final number of primary studies at the end of this phase was 171.  
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TABLE I.  SLR PHASES AND NUMBER OF PUBLICATIONS IN CONFERENCE VERSION 
Source P1: Studies 
investigated 
P2: Studies selected 
after reading abstract 
P3: Studies selected 
after reading full 
text 
P4: Studies finally 
selected 
IEEE (Publisher) 775 75 60 67 
ACM (Publisher) 125 15 11 10 
Elsevier (Publisher) 448 22 14 14 
Springer (Publisher) 689 33 21 22 
Wiley (Publisher) 163 6 4 4 
Australian Workshop on Safety 
Critical Systems and Software - 7 4 4 
HASE (Conference) - 0 0 0 
IET System Safety (Conference) - 12 8 8 
ISoLA (Conference) - 4 3 3 
ISSRE (Conference) - 2 2 2 
SAFECOMP (Conference) - 20 17 14 
Safety Critical System Symposium 
(Conference) - 14 12 12 
Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety (Journal) - 4 3 3 
IEEE Transactions on Reliability 
(Journal) - 0 0 0 
IEEE Transactions on Software 
Engineering (Journal) - 2 1 1 
Expert Knowledge - - - 7 
 2,200 216 160 171 
 
To maximize the reliability of the SLR, we conducted a second publication selection process following 
the completion of the first publication selection process and the extraction of relevant data from the 
primary studies identified in the first process. In the second process, Google Scholar was used as the 
source for automatic search. This second process was meant as a confirmatory measure to increase 
confidence in the generalizability of the (earlier-obtained) findings from the first process. More 
specifically, the second process aimed to ensure that the key observations made based on the first process 
were not volatile, in the sense that the observations would no longer be valid in light of new findings. 
The second publication selection process consisted of four steps, shown in Table II (represented as S1, 
S2, S3 and S4). In step 1, when we applied the search string, we obtained a total of 5,430 studies‡.  Since 
the inclusion of Google Scholar was to further mitigate the risk of having missed relevant publications 
and information, we only checked over half the studies (2,763). In step 2, we excluded publications that 
were from any of the publishers’ sites previously checked and also those matching the exclusion criteria 
(grey literature, technical reports, etc.). This resulted in the selection of 97 studies. In step 3, the second 
author selected 49 studies after reading the abstract. These studies, which had not been identified through 
the first selection process, were all peer-reviewed publications listed on webpages of universities, 
organisations, research associations, or small publishers. In step 4, the first author performed a full text 
review of these 49 studies and selected 39 as primary studies. Additionally, 7 papers were added based on 
expert knowledge during this second publication selection process. 
 
 
 
                                                 
‡ Performing an automatic search for publications in Google Scholar had two main constraints. First, Google Scholar 
allows access (to read the content) only for the first 1000 results of a search. Second, the search engine permits only a limited 
length search string. In order to obtain only 1000 results per search and have a search string of acceptable length, we used a 
number of separate sub-strings that were based on the original search string. The sub-strings were a result of different 
combinations of the three parts of the main string (Section 3.3). 
 10 
 
TABLE II.  PUBLICATION SELECTION PROCESS AND NUMBER OF PUBLICATIONS IN GOOLE SCHOLAR 
Source S1: Studies 
investigated 
S2: Studies selected 
after applying 
exclusion criteria 
S3: Studies selected 
after reading 
abstract 
S4: Studies finally 
selected 
Google Scholar 2,763 97 49 39 
Expert Knowledge - -   - 8 
 2,763 97 49 47 
 
The two publication selection processes outlined above collectively resulted in 171 + 47 = 218 primary 
studies for the SLR. 
3.5 Data Extraction and Quality Criteria 
We designed a data extraction template (a spreadsheet) to collect the information needed to answer the 
research questions. Apart from the bibliographic information (title, authors, year, and publisher), we 
extracted from each study the application domain in which the system under assessment or certification 
was used, the underlying safety standard(s) used to show compliance, the information, artefact, tool, or 
technique contributing to evidence, techniques for evidence structuring, techniques for assessing 
confidence on the evidence collected, and the needs and challenges addressed about provision of 
evidence. Appendix A provides a table with some sample data extracted from the studies. All the 
information about the data extracted from all the studies can be found in [20].  
We further extracted data for publication quality assessment. For this, we defined three criteria: 
 Evidence abstraction level, which was assigned on the basis of the specificity of the evidence 
instances presented in a given study. The levels allow us to weight the quality of evidence 
items identified from the analysis of the primary studies. The abstraction levels defined, from 
the most abstract to the most specific, were: generic, domain level, safety standard level, 
system type level, and specific system level. Using the evidence types from our evidence 
classification (Section 4.1), example instances of evidence for the non-generic abstraction 
levels are: Hazard specification for domain level (e.g., nuclear domain) [PS98], Source code 
for safety standard level (e.g., for DO-178B [PS172]), System Historical Service Data 
Specification for system type level (e.g., COTS-based systems [PS170]), and Model Checking 
Results for specific system level, e.g., instantiated for a specific pacemaker software [PS84]. 
The  “generic”  abstraction   level   refers to instances of evidence mentioned in a primary study 
that are not presented within the scope of any specific domain, standard, system type, or 
specific system. Generally, we consider lower abstraction levels and thus more specific 
evidence to be more useful since it is more likely for those studies to contain some practical 
advice. 
 Validation method, which was assigned based on how a given study had been validated. The 
studies were classified as: case study (validated during projects by practitioners different from 
the authors), field study (validated with data from real projects, but not during the execution of 
the projects), action research (validated during real projects by the authors themselves), survey 
(validated  on   the  basis  of  practitioners’  opinion  and  perspectives),  or  none. It is important to 
note   that   we   use   the   term   “validation”   in   a   broad   sense.   In   particular,   validation   does   not  
necessarily imply validation in a controlled environment such as a controlled experiment. 
Indeed, we did not find any primary studies reporting a controlled experiment. Nonetheless, we 
consider information gathered from validated work to be more useful as they better reflect the 
state of practice. 
 Tool support, which assists in the provision of evidence (collection, structuring, and 
assessment) for certification or safety assurance purposes. We consider the availability of tool 
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support to be an important maturity factor for the underlying technique and a necessary step for 
its industrial application.  
4 RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the review, answering the research questions individually based on 
the extracted data from the 218 studies over a publication period of 22 years. With respect to the 
application domains and the safety standards referred to in the studies, we identified eight application 
domains and 16 safety standards.  
Figure 1 shows: (a) the number of primary studies published from 1990 to 2011; (b) the number of 
papers found for each domain, and (c) the number of papers per safety standard referred to in the 
literature. Publications during the year 2012 are not shown in the Figure 1 (a) since this was the year the 
search was performed and would represent partial numbers. The eight application domains identified in 
the studies are: 
1) Aerospace: dealing with systems in crafts that fly in the atmosphere and outer space 
2) Aviation: dealing with aircrafts systems that fly in the troposphere 
3) Automotive: dealing with systems that run on motor-vehicles on the road 
4) Maritime & (Offshore) Energy: dealing with systems in ships and offshore units, and for oil, gas, 
and offshore natural resource extraction 
5) Medical: dealing with systems in medicine and healthcare 
6) Nuclear: dealing with systems in nuclear power plants and controllers 
7) Railway: dealing with rail-road systems that run on tracks 
8) Robotics: dealing with the design, construction, operation, and application of robots 
 
   (a)  
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(b) 
 
 
 (c) 
 
Figure 1. (a) Number of studies per publication year, (b) Number of studies per application domain, (c) Number of studies per safety standard 
 
Note that in Figure 1, we do not include studies that mention more than one domain or safety standard. 
Although some of the domains or standards in these studies are within the scope of the SLR, we could not 
conclusively determine the domain or standard to which the relevant information (evidence information, 
technique, tools) would correspond.  
 
4.1 What information contstitues evidence of compliance with safety standards? 
We created a taxonomy, shown in Figure 2, for evidence types based on the various evidence 
examples, artefacts, tools and techniques found in the primary studies. A taxonomy provides an intuitive 
and yet comprehensive way to present and summarize the fraction of the results having to do with 
evidence information requirements, especially considering the vast amount of information found in the 
primary studies (See Appendix B). Moreover, the taxonomy is an effective means for communicating the 
results in a more structured manner. Several iterations were made before the current structure of the 
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taxonomy was developed. Experts in system safety and certification reviewed and provided feedback on 
the extracted evidence types.  
The taxonomy contains 49 different basic evidence types, denoted as leaf nodes in Figure 2. Each leaf 
node in the taxonomy has been referred to by at least two primary studies. The taxonomy is 
complemented by a glossary given in Appendix B. The glossary provides some clarifications to ensure a 
better understanding of the taxonomy and how it was built. The glossary also provides (1) a definition for 
each basic evidence type, (2) the source(s) on which the definition is based (different from safety 
standards), (3) the synonyms identified in the literature for each evidence type, and (4) the tools, 
techniques, artefacts, and information considered as or used to provide evidence in the literature. The full 
list of extracted data from each primary study and citations are available in [20]. 
Table III provides the information regarding the number and percentage of studies in which each 
evidence type was identified. Since different studies had information at different abstraction levels 
(Section 3.5), we denote the lowest abstraction level identified for each evidence type in the table. 
Our results indicate that the most frequent evidence types referred to in the literature are Hazards 
Cause Specification (appearing in 111 out of 218 papers, i.e., 51%), Risk Analysis Results (51%), Hazard 
Specification (43%), Accident Specification (34%), Requirements Specification (24%), Hazards 
Mitigation Specification (23%), and Design Specification (20%). The least frequent types are 
Communication Plan (1%), System Testing Results (1%), Object Code (1%), Non-operational Testing 
Results (1%), Project Risk Management Plan (2%) and Normal Range Testing Results (2%). Only 
Communication Plan has not been mentioned in studies that have been validated. The above frequencies 
indicate that the evidence types under Safety Analysis Results (in Figure 2) are the most common.  
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Figure 2. Evidence taxonomy 
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TABLE III. EVIDENCE TYPE IDENTIFIED IN THE PRIMARY STUDIES 
Evidence Type Number of Papers 
Percentage of 
Papers Lowest abstraction level 
Hazard causes specification 111 51% Specific System Level 
Risk analysis results 111 51% Specific System Level 
Hazard specification 93 43% Specific System Level 
Accidents specification 75 34% Specific System Level 
Requirements specification 52 24% Specific System Level 
Hazards mitigation specification 51 23% Specific System Level 
Design specification 43 20% System Type Level 
Review results 37 17% Specific System Level 
Structural coverage testing results 36 17% Specific System Level 
System historical service data specification 27 12% Specific System Level 
Traceability specification 27 12% Specific System Level 
Development and V&V staff competence specification 26 12% Specific System Level 
Reused component historical service data specification 26 12% Specific System Level 
Simulation results 25 11% Specific System Level 
Model checking results 24 11% Specific System Level 
Unit testing results 24 11% Safety Standard Level 
Automated static analysis results 23 11% Specific System Level 
Architecture specification 22 10% Specific System Level 
Development plan 22 10% Specific System Level 
Integration testing results 20 9% Safety Standard Level 
Reliability testing results 20 9% Specific System Level 
Activity records 18 8% Specific System Level 
Functional testing results 18 8% Safety Standard Level 
Modification procedures plan 17 8% Specific System Level 
V&V plan 16 7% Specific System Level 
Inspection results 15 7% Specific System Level 
Operation procedure plan 15 7% Specific System Level 
Safety management plan 15 7% Specific System Level 
Source code 15 7% System Type Level 
Configuration management plan 14 6% System Type Level 
Performance testing results 14 6% Specific System Level 
Theorem proving results 14 6% Specific System Level 
Reused component specification 13 6% Specific System Level 
Robustness testing results 13 6% Specific System Level 
Stress testing results 12 6% System Type Level 
Operator competence specification 11 5% Specific System Level 
Tool support specification 11 5% Safety Standard Level 
Operational testing results 10 5% Specific System Level 
Acceptance testing results 9 4% Specific System Level 
Assumptions and conditions specification 8 4% Specific System Level 
System inception specification 7 3% Specific System Level 
Project monitoring plan 6 3% System Type Level 
Test cases specification 6 3% Specific System Level 
Normal range testing results 5 2% Specific System Level 
 Project risk management plan 5 2% Safety Standard Level 
Non-operational testing results 3 1% Specific System Level 
Object code 3 1% Safety Standard Level 
System testing results 3 1% Safety Standard Level 
Communication plan 2 1% Domain Level 
 
4.2 RQ2: What techniques are used for structuring evidence to show compliance with safety standards?  
In 117 of the 218 selected studies, we identified some technique for structuring safety evidence. We 
divide the techniques into three main categories, described below. The percentage given for each 
category is the rate of papers in that category over the 107 relevant papers. Some studies referred to 
more than one technique.  
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1. Argumentation-Induced Evidence Structure (92%): Argumentation is an approach that communicates 
the reasons why a system is considered to be acceptably safe. The structure of the argumentation 
induces a specific way to structure the evidence, as arguments need to be supported by evidence that 
directly substantiates them. The structure induced as the result of the argumentation can be expressed 
either graphically or textually. In the graphical sub-category, we identified the following techniques: 
 GSN (e.g., [PS3][PS5][PS8][PS9][PS10]), which can be used to document explicitly the 
elements and structure of  an  argument  and  the  argument’s  relationship  to  evidence.  In  GSN,  
the claims of the argument are documented as goals and items of evidence are documented in 
solutions. 
 CAE (e.g., [PS20][PS22][PS72][PS78]), which promotes a three-tiered approach similar to 
GSN, composed of a top-level claim asserted within an argument, a description of the 
arguments presented to support a claim, and a reference to the evidence that is presented to 
support a claim or argument.  
 BBN (e.g., [PS23][PS38][PS58][PS175][PS178]), which induces a structures to evidence in a 
directed acyclic graph representing the conditional dependencies among them. 
 KAOS, which is a goal modelling language that has also been used for safety case 
specification [PS137][PS208]. This approach decomposes top-level goals using AND/OR 
operators in an argumentation-like way until evidence of goal achievement is provided. 
 SSG [PS138], which are linear graphs that represent a safety specification as nodes and 
evidence and relationships among them as edges. 
In the textual sub-category, we include studies that use a structured text-based presentation of the 
arguments and the evidence supporting them. We identified the following techniques in the textual sub-
category: 
 Trust Cases [PS176][PS3], which induce a structured textual format for safety claims, 
arguments, and evidence presenting them as assumptions with references to documents. 
 Structured HTML [PS185], which uses HTML tags to link and structure the various 
artefacts used as evidence for safety. 
 Structured text [PS80], which proposes several possible approaches namely: structured 
prose, which introduces a certain structure to a normal prose by requiring that the critical 
parts of the argument be explicitly denoted; argument outline, which uses indentation, 
numbering, and different fonts to structure arguments and evidence adopting an outline 
format; mathematical proof, which uses the geometric proofs structure (given, statements, 
and reasons) used in mathematics; and, LISP style, which uses the syntax structure of the 
LISP programming language with short names and parentheses for evidence and arguments.  
 
2. Model-Based Evidence Specification (5%): We classify in this category those techniques that 
characterize the structure of safety evidence using models. We identified the following approaches in 
the studies:  
 Sector-specific UML meta-models [PS54][PS122] and UML profiles built specifically for 
standards such as DO-178B [PS172] and IEC61508 [PS121]. 
 Data modelling using entity-relationship diagrams to structure the data content in large safety 
cases including the evidence aspects [PS99]. 
 Process models capturing the activities or processes that produce the artefacts used as 
evidence and present them using a tree-based structure [PS67]. 
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3. Textual Templates (3%): These templates provide predefined sections or tables along with constraints 
for structuring evidence in a predefined textual format. We identified the following approaches: 
 The CENELEC template [PS51][PS118], which is used in the railway domain for structuring 
evidence in a series of reports such as quality management reports and safety management 
reports. 
 The ACRuDA template [PS50], which is used to structure evidence according to a pre-defined 
safety case structure. 
 Template Add-ons [PS19], which provides a template for predefined set of documents that are 
to be produced at different system development and safety assurance phases. It also provides 
suggestions on the required approaches for documentation, semi-formal description, and 
verification and validation procedures. 
Figure 3 shows the number of studies that refer to each evidence structuring technique. Two 
clarifications need to be made in relation to the evidence structuring techniques identified. First, we did 
not consider unstructured text because it does not provide means for systematically organising evidence 
information. Second, in the Model-Based Specification category, we only considered techniques that are 
aimed at specifying the structure of the evidence, as opposed to the structure of, for instance, the system 
that the evidence is generated or used for. For example, AADL [PS56] has been used for modelling the 
architecture and design of safety-critical systems, but not for modelling the structure of safety evidence. 
Hence, AADL was not considered as an evidence structuring technique. In contrast, UML, due to its 
broader expressiveness, has been used for modelling both systems and safety evidence, and was hence 
considered. 
 
 
Figure 3. Number of studies referring to each evidence structuring technique 
4.3 RQ3: What techniques are used for assessing the adequacy of evidence? 
We identified techniques for evidence assessment in 105 of the total 218 studies. We classify these 
techniques into four categories. The percentage given for each category is the rate of papers in that 
category over the 105 relevant papers. Some studies referred to more than one type of technique.  
1. Qualitative Assessment (68%): We classify techniques that use non-numerical methods for 
assessment of evidence in this category. Argumentation (e.g., [PS1][PS7][PS11][PS14][PS30]) is the 
most widely identified technique under qualitative assessment. Argumentation can be based on 
unrestricted natural language, (semi-) structured natural language, or graphical argumentation 
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structures such as GSN. Graphical argumentation structures generally have the advantage of being 
easier to understand, review, and navigate. Argumentation can be enhanced by “qualitative tags” that 
capture the level of trustworthiness of evidence. The approaches that we found for this purpose are: 
 Safety Evidence Assurance Levels (SEAL) [PS57], providing four levels to capture the degree 
of confidence in safety evidence, the highest level of assurance being incontrovertible, 
followed by compelling, persuasive, and the lowest level being supportive. 
 Safety Assurance Levels (SAL) [PS128][PS162][PS170], which are similar to SEALs but also 
address confidence propagation rules between arguments and sub-arguments. 
Our review also identified qualitative methods for assessment that are not based on argumentation. 
These are: 
 Activity-based quality model [PS83], which uses quality matrices to assess evidence for 
compliance with the IEC62304 standard. 
 Evidence-confidence conversion process [PS171], which assesses safety evidence through a 
review process that results in the specification of the confidence in the safety of the system. 
 
2. Checklists (16%): We classify in this category techniques that introduce a “to-do  list” consisting of a 
set of guided questions that need to be answered or checked while reviewing the evidence. The 
questions could, for example, be a set of conditions that must be met in order to gain confidence in 
the evidence collected and to check its sufficiency [PS66]. We identified different variations of 
checklists in the literature: 
 Design Checklists [PS114], which assess evidence based on the design of the system. 
 GQM-based checklists [PS47], which are based on the Goal/Question/Metric measurement 
framework [6]. They define top-level goals for assessing product and process evidence, 
questions to be answered to achieve these goal and metrics providing a measurable reference 
against which analysis can be performed. 
 Argumentation-based checklists [PS109], which assess evidence by mixing checklists with 
argumentation. 
 The Taxonomy-Based Questionnaire [PS79], which contains 305 questions addressing the 
safety attributes and artefacts in the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy and Software Safety 
Risk Evaluation process [14]. 
 Plain Checklists [PS50], which are checklists that do not fall under any of the more specific 
variations discussed above. 
 
3. Quantitative Assessment (10%): We classify in this category techniques that use numerical measures 
for assessment of evidence. These techniques are: 
 BBNs (e.g., [PS41][PS101][PS134][PS167][PS168]), which assess evidence in the presence 
of uncertainty by using conditional probability distributions. This technique is used in 
conjunction with BBN structuring of evidence (Section 4.2). This is the most frequent 
quantitative technique in the literature for evidence assessment. 
 The Modus approach [PS137], which combines quantitative assessment with formal 
argumentation structures. The approach is based on quantitative reasoning that uses goal 
models (KAOS), expert elicitation, and probabilistic simulation for assessing the overall goal 
of a safety case.  
 Evidence Volume Approach [PS96], which allows an internal expert to assign weighted 
factors on evidence that describe the relative importance of each piece of evidence. An 
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aggregate function is then chosen for the weighted evidence to calculate a volume known as 
evidence volume, based on which an outcome (accept or reject) is chosen. 
 
4. Logic-based Assessment (6%): In this category, we classify techniques that use logical formulae, such 
as first-order logic statements, to articulate and verify the properties of interest over evidence items 
and their relationships. Logic-based techniques are best suited for checking the well-formedness and 
consistency constraints of evidence information. For example, OCL [23] has been used to ensure that 
there is a consistent link between the evidence items produced for a particular system, and that the 
evidence items required by a safety standard are available [PS122][PS82][PS83][PS121][PS122] 
[PS131]. 
Figure 4 shows the number of studies that refer to each evidence assessment technique. It is important 
to make the following clarifications about the evidence structuring techniques identified. First, in the 
literature, expert judgment can and has been used in conjunction with all the techniques outlined above. 
However, we have not regarded expert judgment per se as an assessment technique. For expert judgment 
to have any credibility, the rationale behind it must always be made explicit (e.g., through assumptions 
or argumentation). Second, we do not regard assignment of integrity levels such as SIL as a technique 
for evidence assessment. These levels are concerned with the assessment of the integrity of the product 
that the evidence relates to, not the integrity of evidence itself. 
 
 
Figure 4. Number of studies referring to each evidence assessment technique 
 
4.4 RQ4: What challenges and needs have been the target of investigation in relation to safety 
evidence?  
We identified several categories of general challenges and needs related to providing safety evidence 
information and to structuring and assessing the evidence. Some primary studies note more than one 
need or challenge. Although not all the corresponding primary studies are referenced in each category, 
examples are provided to better understand how the primary studies were categorised. The categories of 
challenges and needs addressed in the literature are as follows: 
1. Specification of evidence content: The challenge that was noted the most (60 papers out of 218) was 
determining in a systematic way what information was necessary to be provided as evidence in a 
given domain and for compliance with a particular set of applicable standards. For example, Habli & 
Kelly [PS69] address the challenge of finding the right balance between product-based and process-
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based evidence for certification. Similarly, Bate et al. [PS12] investigate the challenge of identifying 
supporting evidence when modern super-scalar processors are used in the current safety-critical 
systems. We think that the evidence taxonomy built as a response to RQ1 can help tackle this 
challenge.  
2. Construction of safety cases: The second most identified challenge (57 papers) relates to the 
development of safety cases, particularly providing methodological guidance for safety case 
construction and decomposition of the arguments and the evidence in a way that permits more 
precise and cost-effective demonstration of compliance. The need for well-defined structures for 
claims, arguments, and evidence relates to the structuring techniques identified in RQ2. For example, 
Bishop et al. [PS20] acknowledge the importance of constructing well-defined safety cases to 
minimize safety and commercial risk. They propose a top-down approach for safety case 
development that structures safety cases in layers to accommodate changes in them. Similarly, 
Feather & Markosian [PS55] discuss   the   challenge   of   building   safety   cases   for   NASA’s   safety-
critical space software and provide guidance to help future developers of safety cases for similar 
software systems. 
3. Capturing the degree of credibility or relevance of the evidence: We identified 31 papers in which 
researchers acknowledged that different evidence items could have different levels of credibility 
depending on their source, or different degrees of contribution towards the satisfaction of different 
compliance requirements. To capture credibility or relevance, one might need to be able to assign 
weights to the evidence items or to the links between evidence items and safety arguments or claims. 
For example, Bouissou et al. [PS23] use BBN for helping assessors weight the evidence provided by 
using probability distribution functions. Similarly, Czerny et al. [PS37] discuss the challenge of 
providing convincing evidence of safety for “by-wire systems” in the automotive domain. This 
represents a major technology change demanding higher levels of analysis, design, and verification. 
Techniques identified in RQ3 for evidence assessment relate to this need. 
4. Better development processes and better evidence about process compliance: Among the selected 
primary studies, 30 noted the need for better development processes of safety-critical systems, 
thereby making it easier to rigorously verify that the development process followed is in compliance 
with the applicable safety standards. For example, Habli & Kelly [PS67] use a model-based 
approach to define an extendable metamodel for describing the lifecycle process and reliability 
assurance process by enabling automatic verification of compliance with safety standards. In another 
example, Hall & Rapanotti [PS71] introduce the concept of assurance-driven design for system 
development, which regards assurance arguments or assurance cases as important as the product 
itself. 
5. Ambiguities of safety standards: We identified 25 primary studies citing ambiguities (or problems) in 
the application of standards, such as the existence of multiple interpretations of the evidence 
requirements in the standards. These studies also provided guidance on how to show compliance 
with a single standard or a set of standards. For example, Evans et al. [PS53] explore the evidence 
requirements and its sufficiency for the UK defence standard 00-56, and compare them with civil 
standards such as DO-178B, ARP4754, ARP4761, and IEC 61508. Dittel & Aryus [PS46] discuss 
the challenges of interpretation, implementation, and identification of the right level of detail when 
building safety cases for compliance with ISO 26262. 
6. Certification of systems made up of components and subsystems: We identified 17 papers that 
mentioned challenges related to the construction, structuring, and assessment of evidence for 
systems that reuse existing components or subsystems such as legacy or Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS) software. For example, Fan & Kelly [PS170] propose a contract-based approach for 
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justifying the use of COTS in safety-critical systems. The approach evaluates application-specific 
safety requirements against corresponding assurance requirements derived from the COTS. Esposito 
et al. [PS52] propose another systematic approach for qualification and selection of COTS based on 
a customized quality model that can guide and evaluate COTS selection. 
7. Need for providing argumentation: We identified nine papers that address the importance of 
demonstrating and justifying how evidence collected supports safety claims through argumentation. 
For example, Linling & Kelly [PS100] explore the need for a clear and defensible arguments and 
potential issues of argumentation-based assurance in aircraft certification. Clegg [PS32] discusses 
how faults and failures can be introduced into a FPGA, what possible mitigation techniques can be 
used, and the need for arguments to demonstrate how a FPGA meets its safety requirements. 
8. Demonstration of compliance for novel technologies: Seven papers cited challenges related to 
provision of evidence for certification of systems that make use of technologies that are novel for 
safety-critical domains. For example, Daniel & Mario [PS139] discuss how new computing trends 
like ubiquitous computing needs to be adaptive to react appropriately to dynamic changes to 
environment and user requirements. They also present details of conditional safety certificates to 
evaluate safety of adaptive systems. In a similar vein as the above, Rushby [PS136] discusses how 
novel technologies like adaptive systems modify and synthesize functions at runtime, and proposes a 
framework that uses runtime verification, thereby allowing certification to be partially performed at 
runtime. 
9. First-time certification or recertification   of   “proven-in-use”   systems:   We identified seven papers 
highlighting the challenge of certifying systems that have not been previously certified, or 
recertification  of  systems  that  previously  invoked  the  “proven-in-use”  principle  but  can  no  longer do 
so, e.g., due to tighter regulations or the fact that the systems evolved since they were last certified as 
proven-in-use. Proven-in-use here refers to the situation where there is convincing evidence, based 
on the previous operation of the system, that it meets the relevant safety requirements of a standard. 
For example, Cameron et al. [PS187] provide an approach for certification of UAS by demonstrating 
compliance to relevant proven-in-use UAS airworthiness codes. In another example, Meacham et al. 
[PS111] address the issue of applying traditional software safety standards to legacy safety-critical 
systems, with the aim of re-certifying the legacy systems. The paper proposes a model that captures 
relationships between pre- and post-modification software, and a framework that provides guidance 
on how to achieve airworthiness certification for the modified legacy software.  
 
4.5 RQ5: What commonalities exist among different application domains with regards to RQ1-RQ4? 
In this section, we compare the results obtained for RQ1-4 with the eight domains identified in the 
literature. We analyse which evidence types, structuring techniques, assessment techniques, and 
challenges have been addressed in each domain. 
The rate information in the tables that follow (e.g., the last column of Table V) specifies the 
percentage of domains in which a particular evidence type, technique, or challenge was found. The total 
(e.g., the last row of Table V) specifies the percentage of evidence types, techniques, or challenges that 
have been found in a particular domain. 
The x symbol shows that the particular evidence type, technique, or challenge has been found for a 
domain in at least one study. We did not consider for this analysis those studies that (1) indicate more 
than one domain or (2) do not explicitly specify the application domain that they target. 
Table IV provides the comparison for the evidence types.  Nine types have been identified in all the 
domains: Development and V&V Staff Competence Specification, Hazards Causes Specification, 
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Hazards Mitigation Specification, Hazards Specification, Requirements Specification, Risk Analysis 
Results, Review Results, Traceability Specification, and Unit Testing Results.  
Table V presents a matrix of the categories of evidence structuring techniques and the application 
domains. Argumentation-induced evidence structure has been identified in all the domains. More than 
one structuring technique was identified in aerospace, aviation, maritime & energy, and railway 
domains.  
Table VI presents a matrix of the categories of evidence assessment techniques and the domains. 
Qualitative assessment has been identified in all the domains. Aviation includes all the four categories of 
evidence assessment techniques. Except Robotics, all domains have referred to at least two evidence 
assessment categories. The reason could be because we identified only one study in this domain.  
Table VII presents the matrix of identified challenges or needs in each of the application domains. 
Difficulties with categorising evidence information or specifying what evidence information is made of, 
and challenges with safety case construction have been reported in all the domains. Aviation has 
acknowledged all the eight categories of challenges.  
 
TABLE IV.        EVIDENCE TYPES IN DIFFERENT APPLICATION DOMAINS 
Evidence Types Aerospace Automotive Aviation Medical Maritime Nuclear Railway Robotics Rate 
Acceptance Testing 
Results - - X - - X X - 38% 
Accidents Specification X X X - X X X X 88% 
Activity Records X X X X X X X - 88% 
Architecture 
Specification X X - - - X - - 38% 
Assumptions and 
Conditions 
Specification 
- 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
- 
 
- 
 
X 
 
- 
 50% 
Automated Static 
Analysis Results X X X X - X X X 88% 
Communication Plan - - X X - - - - 25% 
Configuration 
Management Plan - X X - - - X - 38% 
Design Specification - X X X X X X X 88% 
Development Plan X X X - X X X - 75% 
Development and V&V 
Staff Competence 
Specification 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 100% 
Functional Testing 
Results - - X X - - - - 25% 
Hazards Causes 
Specification X X X X X X X X 100% 
Hazards Mitigation 
Specification X X X X X X X X 100% 
Hazards Specification X X X X X X X X 100% 
Inspection Results X - X X X - - X 63% 
Integration Testing 
Results X X X - - X X - 63% 
Model Checking Results X X X X - X - X 75% 
Modification 
Procedures Plan X X X X - - X - 63% 
Non-operational Testing 
Results - - X X - - X - 38% 
Normal Range Testing 
Results - X - - - - X X 38% 
Object Code - - X - - - - - 13% 
Operation Procedures 
Plan - - X X X - X - 50% 
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Operational Testing 
Results X - X - - - - X 38% 
Operator Competence 
Specification - - X X X - - X 50% 
Performance Testing 
Results X - X - - - - - 25% 
Project Monitoring Plan - - X X - - - - 25% 
Reliability Testing 
Results X - X - - X X - 50% 
Requirements 
Specification X X X X X X X X 100% 
Reused Component 
Specification - - X X - X X - 50% 
Reused Component 
Historical Service Data 
Specification 
X 
 
- 
 
X 
 
- 
 
X 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 38% 
Review Results X X X X X X X X 100% 
Risk Analysis Results X X X X X X X X 100% 
Project Risk 
Management Plan - - - X - - - - 13% 
Robustness Testing 
Results - X X X - X - - 50% 
Safety Management 
Plan - - - - X - X - 25% 
Source Code - - X X - X X - 50% 
Simulation Results X X X - X X - X 75% 
Stress Testing Results X - X - - - - - 25% 
Structural Coverage 
Testing Results X X X - - X X X 75% 
System Historical 
Service Data 
Specification 
- 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
- 
 
- 
 63% 
System Inception 
Specification - X X - - - - - 25% 
System Testing Results X - X - - - - - 25% 
Test Cases Specification - X X - - - - - 25% 
Theorem Proving 
Results X X X - X - X X 75% 
Tool Support 
Specification - - X - - - - - 13% 
Traceability 
Specification X X X X X X X X 100% 
Unit Testing Results X X X X X X X X 100% 
V&V Plan - X - X - X - - 38% 
Total 55% 59% 90% 57% 43% 53% 57% 41%  
 
 
 
TABLE V.        EVIDENCE STRUCTURING TECHNIQUES IN DIFFERENT APPLICATION DOMAINS 
Domain Argumentation-Induced Evidence Structure Model-Based Evidence Specification Textual templates Total 
Aerospace X X - 67% 
Automotive X - - 33% 
Aviation X X - 67% 
Medical X - - 33% 
Maritime & Energy X X - 67% 
Nuclear X - - 33% 
Railway X - X 67% 
Robotics X - - 33% 
Rate 100% 38% 13%  
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TABLE VI.        EVIDENCE ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES IN DIFFERENT APPLICATION DOMAINS 
Domain Qualitative assessment Checklists Quantitative assessment Logic-based assessment Total 
Aerospace X X - - 50% 
Automotive X X - X 75% 
Aviation X X X X 100% 
Medical X X - X 75% 
Maritime & Energy X - X X 75% 
Nuclear X - X - 50% 
Railway X X - X 75% 
Robotics X - - - 25% 
Rate 100% 63% 38% 63%  
 
TABLE VII.        CHALLENGES AND NEEDS ADDRESSED IN DIFFERENT APPLICATION DOMAINS 
Challenges And Needs 
 Aerospace Automotive Aviation Medical 
Maritime 
& Energy Nuclear Railway Robotics Rate 
Specification of 
evidence content X X X X X X X X 
100
% 
Construction of safety 
cases X X X X X X X X 
100
% 
Capturing the degree of 
credibility or relevance 
of the evidence 
X X X X - X X - 75% 
Better development 
processes and evidence 
about process 
compliance 
X X X X X X X - 88% 
Certification of systems 
made up of components 
and subsystems 
X - X - - - - - 25% 
Ambiguities in safety 
standards - X X X - X X - 63% 
Demonstration of 
compliance for novel 
technologies 
X - X - - - - - 25% 
Need for providing 
argumentation - - X - - - - - 25% 
First-time certification 
or recertification of 
“proven-in-use”  systems 
X - X - - - - - 25% 
Total  78% 56% 100% 56% 33% 56% 56% 33%  
 
4.6 Quality Assessment 
As discussed in Section 3.5, we defined three quality criteria for the selected primary studies. This 
section provides our findings in relation to these criteria.  
With regards to evidence abstraction levels, we consider only the lowest (i.e., the most specific) level 
found in any given primary study. As shown in Figure 5 (a), the most frequent evidence abstraction level 
is   “generic”   (35%).   Nevertheless, the remaining levels – which go beyond just providing generic 
examples – still collectively account for a majority of the publications (65%). This said, the lowest-level 
(and in our view the most useful) abstraction levels, namely system-type level and system-specific level, 
account only for 14% of the studies. 
 Figure 5 (b), shows the statistics for the validation methods used by the studies. The vast majority of 
studies (72%) have not been validated with practitioners, or with data from a real project. A small fraction 
of the studies (15%) have been validated in actual projects, by means of action research or case studies. 
The least used validation method is survey (2%). 
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(a)                                                                                                                     (b) 
Figure 5.   (a) Percentage of studies for each evidence abstraction level , (b) Percentage of studies for each validation method 
 
The Communication Plan evidence type, three types of techniques from the Argumentation-Induced 
Evidence Structure (Structured HTML, Structured Text, and Safety Specification Graphs), and six 
evidence assessment techniques (SEAL, SAL, Activity-based Quality Models, Evidence-Confidence 
Conversion Process, Taxonomy-based Questionnaire and Evidence Volume approach) have not been 
mentioned in the studies that have been validated with the methods considered. All the challenges and 
needs identified in the literature have been noted in at least two studies that have been validated. More 
details are shown in Table VIII. Please note that, as explained previously in Section 3.5, the term 
“validation”  does  not  imply  validation  in  a  controlled  experiment  (e.g.  controlled  experiment).   
 
TABLE VIII. NUMBER OF STUDIES VALIDATING EACH STRUCUTRING TECHNIQUE,  ASSESSMENT TECHNQIUE AND CHALLENGE 
Evidence Structuring Technique Validated in No. Of PS 
GSN 21 
CAE 4 
BBN 1 
UML Models 2 
CENELEC Templates 1 
Trust Cases 1 
SSG 0 
KAOS 2 
Structured HTML 0 
Structured Text 0 
Entity-relationship Model 2 
Process Model 2 
ACRuDA template 1 
Template Add-ons 1 
Evidence Assessment Technique Validated in No. Of PS 
Argumentation 18 
Plain Checklists 7 
BBN 2 
OCL 2 
SAL 0 
Design Checklist 1 
GQM-Based Checklist 2 
SEAL 0 
Activity-Based Quality Model 0 
Evidence-Confidence Conversion process 0 
Taxonomy Based Questionnaire 0 
MODUS 1 
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Evidence Volume Approach 0 
Challenges and Needs Identified Validated in No. Of PS 
Specification of evidence content 21 
Construction of safety cases 15 
Capturing the degree of credibility or relevance of the evidence 6 
Better development processes and evidence about process compliance 10 
Certification of systems made up of components and subsystems 6 
Ambiguities in safety standards 4 
Demonstration of compliance for novel technologies 3 
Need for providing argumentation 2 
First-time  certification  or  recertification  of  “proven-in-use”  systems 4 
 
With respect to tool support, 53 studies noted some tool for creating evidence information, structuring 
of evidence, or assessment of evidence. A total of 39 different tools were identified from these studies. 
Table IX provides the list of tools and the number of studies in which each tool was validated. Only five 
tools were noted twice or more than twice in the validated studies.  
 
TABLE IX. TOOLS IDENTIFIED  
Tools Validated in No. Of PS 
ASCE [PS55][PS99][PS10][PS22][PS150][PS173][PS186][PS194][PS5] 9 
SAM [PS78][PS164][PS126][PS152][PS183][PS186][PS194][PS215] 8 
AutoCERT [PS9][PS42][PS175] 3 
Hugin Explorer [PS58][PS167]  2 
DECOS test bench [PS3][PS140] 2 
VerO-Link analysis tool [PS3] 1 
SafeSlice [PS40] 1 
LSRD tool [PS79] 1 
Unnamed tool based on Ms Excel [PS96] 1 
Evidence Agreement tool [PS54] 1 
CLawZ toolset [PS62] 1 
TEAMS-RT [PS104] 1 
Alloy-based prototype tool [PS116] 1 
OSATE [PS56] 1 
Unnamed tool [PS11] 1 
DOORS/TraceLine [PS45] 1 
VAM-LIFE [PS100] 1 
Uppaal model checker, AiT tool for Worst case execution time analysis [PS84] 1 
RODIN Model prover, ProB tool for model analysis [PS114] 1 
Programatica, DevCOP SCMS Eclipse Plug-in [PS142] 1 
eSafetyCase Toolkit [PS152] 1 
A Markup tool (unnamed) [PS171] 1 
SofCheck and GrammaTech [PS93] 1 
Extension to Papyrus/Eclipse [PS82] 1 
ToolNet [PS131] 1 
Excel, Isograph ft+ [PS46] 1 
GTO [PS51] 1 
Modus [PS137] 1 
Unnamed tool [PS148] 1 
Visio plug-in for GSN, ASCE [PS174] 1 
TCT Editor [PS176] 1 
VORD [PS94] 1 
An HTML based webpage [PS185] 1 
Unnamed tool [PS187] 1 
DOVE  [PS207] 1 
KCG qualified code generator [PS210] 1 
Exception analyser [PS213] 1 
AdvoCATE [PS43] 1 
Objectiver [PS208] 1 
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5 DISCUSSION 
In this section, we discuss the implications of the results obtained from the SLR in the context of 
future research and of practice. 
The results from the review provide a general research-oriented view on evidence provision. The 
evidence taxonomy built as part of the review depicts a holistic view of the development and verification 
artefacts and the information that constitutes safety evidence. We believe that this taxonomy is a useful 
reference to new researchers, helping them get better acquainted with the area.  
The taxonomy captures, at an abstract level, the types of information that a safety evidence 
management tool should be capable of handling. One can use the taxonomy to elicit detailed requirements 
about the contents of each evidence type as well as the relationships that must be maintained between 
instances of different evidence types in a tool. Using these requirements, one can further elaborate the 
analysis scenarios for which tool support is required, e.g. checking consistency and propagation of change 
in a collection of inter-related evidence artefacts. 
An important factor to consider regarding tool support is that safety evidence information is often 
distributed across different external tools, e.g., requirements management tools, workflow systems, and 
test automation environments. Consequently, an infrastructure for integration of different (external) tools 
is necessary. An essential direction to pursue then is providing seamless ways to integrate evidence 
information originating from different sources. Initiatives such as OSLC (Open Services for Lifecycle 
Collaboration) [29] can be useful for this purpose. However, several issues must be overcome in order to 
successfully adopt these frameworks for safety evidence management, such as adequate management of 
evidence configuration and of evidence granularity [31].  
Alongside the taxonomy, our results concerning evidence structuring and assessment serve as useful 
input for future work on tool support, bringing together and summarizing the various techniques that have 
been proposed for structuring and assessing safety evidence. 
For practitioners, the taxonomy can be a helpful tool to gain a clearer understanding of what 
information may be relevant for demonstration of compliance with safety standards. In particular, 
information about the evidence types that are validated in real settings or projects can be especially 
valuable to practitioners. They can benefit from the knowledge assimilated by others from the previous 
application of the evidence types. In this sense, the specific artefacts, techniques, and tools presented in 
Appendix B can help practitioners increase their awareness of different alternatives for demonstrating 
compliance with safety standards.  
For most safety standards, some degree of interpretation is required to tailor them to the context of 
application. In particular, the descriptions provided in safety standards regarding the evidence items are 
often abstract and in need of interpretation according to contextual factors. In addition to the individual 
standards being large and requiring interpretation, a system may need to conform to multiple standards. In 
such cases, it is important to be able to build conceptual relationships between different standards and 
state how the different evidence items they envisage map onto one another. A taxonomy like the one we 
have developed is helpful for addressing both of the above problems. First, equipped with the taxonomy, 
practitioners have a precise and yet concise guide for concepts that are of relevance to safety evidence. 
This makes it less likely to overlook important information buried in the text of a standard when 
practitioners are reading and interpreting the standard. Second, the taxonomy can serve as a common 
framework for mapping the evidence information in different standards. Particularly, one can specify how 
each standard maps onto the shared taxonomy and use this information to infer and analyse the pairwise 
relationships between the standards.  
Not all the evidence types that we have identified through the review are always required for 
compliance with a given standard and for a given system. Practitioners will therefore have to determine 
the types of evidence that they need to provide according to the standards they have to comply with, and 
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in the context of their system or domain. Furthermore, the evidence information has to be agreed upon 
with a certification authority beforehand. The certifiers may specify additional constraints on the 
evidence information that needs to be collected. Depending on the regulatory jurisdictions, this may go 
beyond the requirements stipulated by the standards. In such cases, having a generic taxonomy like the 
one developed in this paper is beneficial, in the sense that it allows practitioners and certifiers to perform 
a more thorough analysis of the evidence requirements and reach a consensus about how evidence 
collection should be carried out. 
The taxonomy further provides a common terminology for communication about evidence 
requirements during the certification process. This helps reduce certification costs by avoiding 
terminological mismatches. Such mismatches are a common source of problems during certification, 
arising primarily due to the involvement of multiple experts who have different backgrounds and 
expertise, and typically different understandings of the evidence required by the safety standards [36]. 
The results concerned with the evidence taxonomy (RQ1) indicate that the evidence types having to do 
with safety analysis, requirements, and design have received more attention in the academic literature. 
This prompts an investigation of the state-of-the-practice to confirm that these types are indeed the most 
relevant for showing compliance with safety standards. For example, it can be investigated if these types 
are more frequently used in practice than others such as review results, traceability specification, and 
functional testing results. Such an investigation will also help in identifying the potential gaps between 
the state-of-the-art and the state-of-the-practice. Especially, an open issue to investigate is the potential 
need for further research on the evidence types that were mentioned in only a low percentage of the 
studies (e.g., System Testing Results, Test Case Specification). The outcome of such an investigation 
could be that either: (1) more research is needed to gain insights into the relevance and challenges 
associated with these types, or; (2) the lack of research is due to practitioners not having recurring 
problems with these evidence types. Involvement and feedback from the industry would be essential to 
determine which outcome corresponds to reality. 
As indicated by the results in Section 4.6, a large fraction (35%) of the primary studies only had 
generic-level instances of evidence types. We believe that more research on safety evidence at lower 
levels of abstraction (system type level and specific system level) is necessary in order to obtain a better 
understanding of concrete needs and to be able to provide more useful guidance to practitioners. 
The results about the type of validation performed in the studies show that the majority (72%) of the 
studies have not been validated in realistic settings. We view this as a strong indication of the need for 
work that deals first-hand with the practical aspects of safety certification and provides empirically 
rigorous analyses of the usefulness of the proposed solutions. 
With regards to the tools identified for evidence provision, many of the tools were a combination of 
prototype verification tools and process management tools to assist with the construction and collection 
of evidence information. Only 49% of the tools appeared in papers whose results had been validated in 
real industrial settings. A closer examination of the usefulness and usability of the evidence provision 
tools in real industrial settings will therefore be an important priority.  
The results regarding evidence structuring (RQ2) are useful for both research and practice to promote 
further work on managing large collections of evidence data. The most widely-identified evidence 
structuring technique category was argumentation-induced structuring (Section4.2), which was validated 
in 28% of the studies referring to it. To further capitalize on argumentation-induced structuring, future 
work must focus on effective and modular ways to decompose general safety arguments into coherent 
and cohesive blocks [28]. This would allow for identifying precisely the evidence required to support 
each block. 
With regards to evidence assessment (RQ3), the most referred to category was qualitative assessment, 
validated in 26% of the studies that referred to it. The results in Section 4.3 indicate that argumentation is 
the most commonly used technique for qualitative assessment. We believe that to bring about industrial 
impact in this direction, further research is required to make qualitative reasoning more systematic, 
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particularly when large argumentation structures are involved. Future work must also try to provide 
automated assistance during evidence assessment to ensure correct execution of the assessment process 
and the soundness of assessment outcomes. This way, the assessment will become more dependable and 
less error-prone. 
Again, an important remark to make about evidence structuring and assessment is the lack of adequate 
validation. The large majority of the studies proposing techniques to these ends (63% of structuring and 
69% of assessment techniques) were not validated. Similar to the observations made about evidence types 
and tooling, we believe that more empirical work is required to assess the effectiveness of the proposed 
structuring and assessment solutions. 
With respect to the needs and challenges (RQ4), within the 22-year time window considered, the vast 
majority of the research (88%) was performed in the last 10 years. To provide a finer-grained analysis of 
the trends, we show in Figure 6 the number of papers that tackled each of the identified challenges and 
needs, distinguishing papers published more than 10 years ago from those published in the last 10 years. 
As seen from the figure, demonstration of compliance for novel technologies and first-time 
certification  or   recertification  of  “proven-in-use”   systems have been tackled only in the last 10 years. 
The emergence of the former challenge may be attributable to the desire to introduce new technologies 
into safety-critical domains at a faster pace. This could for example be to benefit from technologies that 
help reduce the carbon-footprint of safety-critical systems and thus ensure that these systems meet the 
new emission targets and standards that they are subject to. Another motivation could be to facilitate 
cross-domain reuse, allowing technologies that have a proven track record in their original domain of 
application to cross over to a new domain (where the technologies would be considered novel) [26]. The 
emergence of the latter challenge may be attributable to tighter regulations regarding when the proven-in-
use clause can be invoked, and also to the increasing demand in the industry for reducing costs [28].  
 
 
Figure 6.  Compasrison of Challenges addressed in the last 10 years with overall challenges identified 
 
Finally, with regards to the domain analysis of the results (RQ5), we observed that the aviation 
domain is omnipresent in all aspects of the information gathered. The domain clearly has a leading 
position on safety certification research and subsequently a large representation in the academic 
literature. Out of the 218 primary studies identified in the review, 55 were from this domain. A second 
reason for this large representation is that the aviation domain generally mandates higher bars and a 
higher level of maturity for safety compliance than others domains. This could mean that some of the 
evidence types and techniques identified in the aviation domain may be out of scope for other domains. 
A future analysis of the state-of-the-practice will provide better clues as to which aspects may 
exclusively concern one domain, e.g., the aviation, but not others. 
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6 THREATS TO VALIDITY 
Following guidelines on validity in SLRs  [18], this section discusses the threats to validity of the SLR 
reported in this paper. 
6.1 Publication bias 
We began the SLR with limited knowledge about all the related venues. Therefore, we decided to start 
with an automatic search. After pilot searches, we selected the venues and journals for manual searches. 
We consider that this mitigated publication bias. 
Initially, we did not assume the breadth of the search (i.e., from 1990) and considered as much peer-
reviewed literature as possible. Inclusion of grey literature such as PhD theses, technical reports, and 
whitepapers might have led to more exhaustive results, potentially with a larger representation from the 
industry. We plan to mitigate this threat in the future by validating the results of the SLR with 
practitioners. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the inclusion of Google Scholar as a source did not 
result in the identification of any new evidence type, new category of techniques for evidence structuring 
and assessment, or new challenges. This makes us believe that the inclusion of grey literature would have 
little or no effect on the SLR results. 
With regards to our search string for automatic search, we avoided, as much as possible, the inclusion 
of terms that are specific to a certain application domain or a certain technique for demonstration of 
compliance. However, we were compelled to include in our final search string the terms, safety case, 
safety argument, assurance case, and dependability case, which are usually associated with the 
argumentation technique for demonstration of compliance. This decision was in response to an 
observation made during the pilot searches: there were numerous argumentation-based studies which 
were concerned with demonstration of compliance to safety standards but which did not explicitly use the 
term   “evidence”.   This   is   natural   because   the   presence   of   evidence   is   implied   in   any   argumentation  
structure. Subsequently, the thoroughness of the SLR would have been negatively affected without 
including these argumentation-related terms in the search string. To mitigate bias towards argumentation 
techniques, we set stringent requirements in our inclusion criteria, so that a safety argumentation study 
does not automatically qualify as a primary study but only if it provides insights relevant to safety 
evidence. 
6.2 Selection of primary studies 
 The first author (PhD candidate) performed most of the selection. This indirectly implies that, due to 
the lack of adequate experience or knowledge about the phenomena under study, some publications might 
have been missed. This is a common threat in SLRs (e.g., [10]), and we performed reliability checks to 
mitigate it. The reliability checks yielded consistent results with the work of the first author. In addition, 
well-defined inclusion and exclusion criteria helped reduce researcher bias in the selection of primary 
studies. 
A common threat to the validity of any SLR is the possibility of missing primary studies and thus 
relevant information. We refined our search string in several iterations, until we were confident that 
sufficient coverage of literature was obtained. We employed stringent mitigation strategies, including 
using Google Scholar as an additional source, manual search, reliability checks and expert knowledge, to 
address this threat to the best of our ability. We believe that the above strategies protect against any major 
flaws.  
The criteria for publication selection (Section3.4) helped us narrow our investigation to a manageable 
(but still large) size. Although some likelihood exists that relevant studies might have been missed, we 
consider that the criteria were the best ones given our time and resource constraints. Subsequent studies in 
the OPENCOSS project§ [25], e.g., a survey of the project’s  aviation, railway, and automotive partners 
                                                 
§ As we stated above, OPENCOSS is the parent project as part of which our SLR was performed. 
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about their certification documentation needs [27], have not found any evidence type that is not already 
included in our proposed taxonomy.  
Four primary studies were initially deemed not relevant and excluded during the publication selection 
process, only to be identified later during the reliability checks. We consider this to be natural because of 
the broader knowledge gained at Phase 4 of the first publication selection process. The checks were 
performed at a final stage, after having created a first version of the evidence taxonomy. Therefore, it was 
easier to identify evidence types, techniques, and challenges. To further mitigate validity threats posed by 
missing publications, we performed a second publication selection process based on Google Scholar as 
explained in Section 3.4. The information obtained through this second process did not give rise to any 
new evidence types, new structuring and assessment techniques, or new challenges. This makes us 
reasonably confident about the validity of the results reported in the SLR.  
6.3 Data extraction and misclassification 
In many cases, we had to interpret information and make assumptions about the type of information 
considered as safety evidence or the validation method used in a study because of the lack of details. The 
first and the second authors checked, agreed upon, and refined the whole set of data extracted on two 
occasions in order to mitigate this threat. The validation methods to take into account were also defined 
before starting data extraction. In relation to the evidence taxonomy, we received feedback on its 
structure and content from some domain experts.  
Finally, although we might have incorrectly extracted and classified some information, we consider 
that having several studies supporting the definition of each evidence type, technique, and challenge 
mitigates this threat.  
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Safety certification is a necessary and yet complex activity for most safety-critical systems. One 
major source of complexity during certification is the specification, collection, and assessment of the 
evidence required for demonstrating compliance with safety standards. Little has been done in the past 
to develop a general body of knowledge about safety evidence that is empirically rigours. Motivated by 
this gap, this paper presented a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) aimed at investigating the state-of-
the-art on provision of safety evidence.  
One of the main outcomes of the SLR is a general taxonomy of safety evidence types. The taxonomy 
classifies safety evidence information into 49 basic types (product and process) identified in the 
literature. We identified that evidence types under Safety Analysis Results, Requirements Specification 
and Design Specification are the most common in literature.  
The SLR further examined and classified existing techniques for structuring evidence information 
into three categories: Argumentation-Induced Evidence Structure, Model-Based Evidence Specification, 
and Textual Templates. Similarly, we classified existing techniques for evidence assessment into four 
categories: Qualitative Assessment, Checklists, Quantitative Assessment and Logic-based Assessment.  
We also examined the research challenges and needs that have been addressed in the literature. We 
classified them into nine broad categories and the three most identified referred to the research questions 
(RQs) of this study: Specification of evidence content (RQ1), Construction of safety cases (RQ2), and 
Capturing the degree of credibility or relevance of the evidence (RQ3). 
Lastly, the paper presented a comparison of eight safety-critical domains in terms of their evidence 
needs and the relevant challenges. Most information gathered in the review was identified in several 
domains. In particular, aviation domain was omnipresent in all aspects of the information gathered.  
As a major finding, the results about the type of validation performed in the studies indicated that the 
majority (72%) of the studies have not been validated in realistic settings. We believe that this is a strong 
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indication of the need for more practitioner-oriented and industry-driven empirical studies in the area of 
safety certification. 
The SLR provides useful insights for both researchers and practitioners. From a research standpoint, 
the evidence taxonomy and the classifications of structuring and assessment techniques provide a global 
overview of existing research on safety evidence. This is helpful both as a general introduction to the 
area, and also as a reference for organising future research. The challenges and needs that have been 
identified are useful for developing a future research agenda. 
As for practitioners, the results, particularly the evidence taxonomy developed, provide a concrete 
reference for learning and tailoring the various types of evidence that may be required during 
certification. Moreover, the taxonomy creates a common terminology for safety evidence. Having such a 
common terminology is advantageous both as a vehicle to facilitate communication and avoid 
misunderstandings, and also as a basis around which tool support can be designed for safety evidence 
management. Requirements for such tool support can be elicited from the results of the SLR. Among 
them, integration with other tools seems to be a key aspect to address. 
The SLR is part of a larger and on-going research effort aimed at improving safety certification 
practices. We emphasize that the SLR is focused exclusively on academic literature. Subsequently, no 
conclusions can be drawn based on our current results by way of correlating the proportional number of 
studies on a certain technique and the usefulness of the technique in practice. Analysing practical 
usefulness and industrial adoption requires studies on the current state of practice and is outside the 
scope of this SLR.  
In the future, we would like to further analyse the dependencies and constraints between different 
evidence types and create more detailed models of evidence information in different domains. To further 
ground our the results of the SLR in industrial needs, we plan to validate the findings of the review by 
(1) conducting new empirical studies (e.g., surveys) for investigating how practitioners provide evidence 
for safety certification and (2) comparing the evidence taxonomy developed, together with its glossary, 
to the information presented in different safety standards regarding the evidence to provide to comply 
with them. These studies would allow us to compare the state of the art and the state of the practice, in 
relation to both what practitioners do and what safety standards indicate. We could also compare how 
different evidence types of the taxonomy (i.e., notions of information that constitute safety evidence) are 
referred to and defined in different application domains, determining their differences and 
commonalities. This would also allow us to find the notions with which some confusion or discrepancies 
exist among different application domains. 
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APPENDIX A: EXAMPLES OF DATA EXTRACTED FROM THE PRIMARY STUDIES 
Bibliographic 
information 
Application 
domain(s) 
Underlying 
standard(s) 
Information/artefact/tool/technique 
contributing to evidence 
Technique
s for 
evidence 
structuring 
Techniques 
for assessing 
evidence 
confidence 
Tool 
support 
Objectives/ 
challenges 
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Evidence 
abstractio
n level 
Validatio
n method 
Andersen, B.S., 
Romanski, G 
[PS3] ACM 
Digital Library 
[2011] 
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For Software Aspects Of 
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Plan, Software Verification Plan, 
Software Configuration Management 
Plan, Quality Assurance Plan, 
Software Design Artefacts, Source 
Code, Verification Methods And 
Data, Formal Methods, Exhaustive 
Input Testing, Structural Coverage 
Analysis Report And Its Review 
Checklist. 
None None 
VerO-
Link 
Analysi
s tool 
Better 
development 
processes and 
better 
evidence 
about process 
compliance 
System 
type level, 
Standard 
Level 
None 
Arthasartsri, S., 
Ren, H [PS6] 
IEEE [2009] 
Aviation Unspecified 
Functional Hazard Analysis, 
Preliminary Risk Analysis, CMA, 
HHA, FHA, IHA, ECHA, RASP, 
CMA, MMEL/CDL, FMEA, FMES, 
Safety Assessment Reliability 
Prediction, Equipment Cmas. 
None None None 
Better 
development 
processes and 
better 
evidence 
about process 
compliance 
Domain 
and 
Specific 
System 
Level 
Case 
Study 
Linling, S. 
Kelly, T. 
[PS100] IEEE 
[2009] 
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and 
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of Safety 
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Level, 
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Action 
Research, 
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S. Wagner, B. 
Schatz, S. 
Puchner, P. 
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IEEE [2010] 
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Models 
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Level, 
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Springer [2011] 
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HRA None None None 
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of systems 
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and 
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Construction 
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Valk, J.-L., Vis, 
H., & Koning, 
G. Phileas 
[PS157] 
Springer [2010] 
Railway CENELEC 
PHA, FTA, hazard log, safety 
requirements, traceability of the 
requirements flow down, architectural 
design, Independent Verification and 
Validation, Quality assurance of the 
development process, requirements 
traceability between models and 
formal requirements, Review and 
static analysis at the model level to 
guarantee compliance to modeling 
standards, Functional verification of 
the models by using requirements 
based test vectors, Automatic code 
generation with built in traceability 
between the source code 
and the models, Code review, 
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Requirements Specification; safety 
Requirements Specification, Safety 
Assessment Report. 
None None None 
Ambiguity in 
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Standards, 
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Safety 
Standard 
Level and 
Specific 
System 
Level 
None 
Hamilton, V 
[PS72] Springer 
[2011] 
Unspecified 
DO-178B, 
IEC 61508 
 
Safety management plan, software 
development and verification plans, 
HAZOP, software design 
specification, integration test results, 
static analysis of code, design 
reviews, normal range testing, 
traceability specification. 
GSN, CAE Argumentation None 
Specification 
of evidence 
content 
 
Generic None 
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APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY OF EVIDENCE TYPES 
We need to make the following clarifications to ensure a better understanding of the taxonomy and 
how it was built: 
 After finding information that could be regarded as evidence in the publications, we classified 
it in different categories.  
 From a (business) process perspective [5]: 
x The tasks related to building, maintaining and using a critical system are specified in the 
Activity Planning. 
x The roles that will execute the tasks are specified in the Activity Planning. 
x The skills and knowledge required (conditions) for task execution are specified in 
Personnel Competence. 
x The necessary inputs (which exist before the critical system is built) correspond to Tool 
Support and Reused Components Information. 
x The outputs (i.e., results) of the process correspond to Activity Records and Product 
Information. 
x The output of one task can be input for another. 
 Product Information also corresponds to Activity Records (i.e., product information shows the 
activities performed).  
 We found that Historical Service Data can refer both to a component that will be reused in a 
new system and to an existing system that aims to be (re-)certified after having been in 
operation. We have considered that the same techniques, artefacts, and information can be used 
for the evidence types defined for both cases (Reused Component Historical Service Data 
Specification and System Historical Service Data Specification). 
 The structure of Safety Analysis Results is based on the common explanation and relationships 
between accidents (aka mishaps), risks, and hazards (e.g., [9]). 
 ⎯ Many techniques for safety analysis can be used to specify several types of evidence. For 
example, FTA can be used for Hazard Cause Specification and Risk Analysis Results [9]. 
 The information regarding static analysis, inspections, and reviews indicated in the studies of 
the SLR has only been considered relevant if the publications indicated the element (i.e., 
artefact)  under  analysis  (e.g.,  “source  code  static  analysis”). 
 Test Cases Specification can refer to any type of Testing Results (e.g., unit test cases). These 
types have only been included in Testing Results to minimize the size of the taxonomy. 
 The structure of the child nodes of Testing Results is based on the testing types classification 
presented in [1].  
 There exist relationships and constraints between evidence types. For example, certain Testing 
Results are linked to the Requirements Specification. They are currently not specified in the 
taxonomy. 
 When specifying test cases and providing test results, a combination of target-based testing, 
objective-based testing, and environment-based testing can be used (e.g., system-performance-
operational testing). 
 
The following table presents a glossary to support the understanding of the Taxonomy (Figure 2) 
with information such as definition of each evidence type, information, techniques, tools and artefacts 
extracted and classified accordingly from the primary studies. 
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Acceptance Testing Results 
Definition: Results  from  the  validation  of  the  behaviour  of  a  critical  system  against  its  customers’  requirements. The 
customers undertake or specify typical tasks to check that their requirements have been met [1]. 
Techniques: user evaluation in mock work environments. 
Accidents Specification 
Definition: Specification of the events that result in an outcome culminating in death, injury, damage, harm, and/or loss as a 
consequence of the occurrence of a hazard of a critical system [9]. 
Techniques: ETA; PHL; PHA; FMEA; FMECA; FMES; IHA; FMEDA. 
Activity Records 
Definition: Specification of the work performed to execute the activity planning of a critical system [9]. 
Artefacts: QA audit results; maintenance log; change requests report; system changes report; review checklists; quality 
management report; safety management report; technical safety report; risk management file; safety and engineering meeting 
minutes; design checklists; V&V effort report; configuration control records; QA activities report; quality control documents; 
safety criteria report; safety compliance assessment report; failure checklist; customer feedback reports; feasibility analysis; 
implementation track; integration report; quality management report; project execution report; hazard checklist; report on 
monitoring operator performance and periodic review of skills; structural coverage analysis review checklist; SAS. 
Information: testing team independence. 
Architecture Specification 
Definition: Description of the fundamental organisation of a critical system, embodied in its components, their relationships 
to each other and to the environment, and the principles guiding its design and evolution [15]. 
Technique: AADL. 
Artefacts: dependence diagram. 
Assumptions and Conditions Specification 
Definition: Description of the constraints on the working environment of a critical system for which it was designed [35]. 
Artefacts: assumptions about the environment where the code is executed; domain assumptions. 
Automated Static Analysis Results 
Definition: Results from an automatic process for evaluating a critical system based on its form, structure, content, or 
documentation [32].  
Techniques: code static analysis; fault model static analysis; control flow analysis; worst case execution time analysis; 
integrity analysis; cyclomatic complexity analysis; data coupling analysis; control coupling analysis. 
Communication Plan 
Definition: Description of the activities targeted at creating project-wide awareness and involvement in the development of a 
critical system [9]. 
Configuration Management Plan 
Definition: Description of how identification, change control, status accounting, audit, and interface of a critical system will 
be governed [5][4].  
Artefacts: SCMP; version management; change control procedures. 
Information: target platform. 
Design Specification 
Definition: Specification of the components, interfaces, and other internal characteristics of a critical system or component 
[5][32]. 
Techniques: ADDL; UML; SysML; SCADE. 
Artefacts: interface design; data structures; state machine. 
Information: safety assessment reliability prediction. 
Development Plan 
Definition: Description of how a critical system will be built. It includes information about the requirements, design, and 
implementation (coding and/or integration) phases [5]. 
Artefacts: SDP; test generation procedure; verification process. 
Information: development methodology; coding standards; coding guidelines; design rules; pair-programming; use of 
industry-standard state machine notations; metrics for function-code size; FFPA method; design technique; implementation 
technique. 
Development and V&V Staff Competence Specification 
Definition: Specification of the skills or knowledge that the parties involved in the development and V&V plans of a critical 
system need in order to carry out the activities assigned to them [35]. 
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Artefacts: developer qualification; engineers CV. 
Information: staff experience; authority and training; tool training; software architects experience; experience, authority, and 
training of verification engineers; reviewer competence. 
Functional Testing Results 
Definition: Results from the validation of whether or not the observed behaviour of a system conforms to its specification 
[1].  
Techniques: hazard directed testing. 
Hazards Causes Specification 
Definition: Specification of the factors that create the hazards of a critical system [9]. 
Techniques: FTA; FMEA; FMECA; anthropometric and workload assessment; Markov Analysis; HAZOP; causal analysis; 
SHARD; common failure analysis; common mode failure analysis; common mode analysis; root cause analysis; FMES; 
FPTC; FPTN; IHA; FFA; ECHA; HEP; HRA; FMEDA. 
Information: human error. 
Hazards Specification 
Definition: Specification of the conditions in a critical system that can become a unique, potential accident [9]. 
Techniques: PHL; PHA; SHA; HHA; FMEA; FMECA; FHA; Petri Nets; Markov Analysis; HAZOP; SHARD; HAZID; 
FMES; vulnerability analysis; IHA; ECHA; HEP; HRA FMEDA. 
Artefacts: hazard log. 
Hazards Mitigation Specification 
Definition: Specification of how to reduce hazard likelihood and hazard consequences when a hazard cannot be eliminated in 
a critical system [9]. 
Synonyms: hazard contingency specification, hazard barriers specification, and hazard protections specification. 
Techniques: PHA; SHA; FMECA; IHA; ECHA; diversity analysis; FMEDA; 
Historical Service Data Specification 
Definition: Specification of the dependability (often, reliability) of a component reused in a critical system based on past 
observation of the behaviour of the component [35]. 
Artefacts: field service experience; product service history; fault log; maintenance reports; studies and reviews of operation 
safety and environmental experience; maintenance records and surveys. 
Information: probability of failure on demand (from past behaviour); prior field reliability in similar applications; failure 
frequency; failure rate; MTTF; MTTR; MTBF. 
Inspection Results 
Definition: Results from the visual examination of system lifecycle work products of a critical system to detect errors, 
violations of development standards, and other problems [32]. 
Synonyms: audit (usually used to refer to inspections made by an independent party [32] 
Technique: functional configuration audit; physical configuration audit; inspection of safety requirements; code inspection; 
independent analysis of requirements and architecture specification; safety audit; independent assessment of tests. 
Artefacts: independent safety audit report.  
Integration Testing Results 
Definition: Results from the evaluation of the interaction between the components of a system [1]. 
Techniques: software integration testing; hardware integration testing; interfaces testing. 
Model Checking Results 
Definition: Results from the verification of the conformance of a critical system to a given specification by providing a 
formal guarantee. The critical system under verification is modelled as a state transition system, and the specifications are 
expressed as temporal logic formulae that express constraints over the system dynamics [5]. 
Techniques: CCS; CSP; LOTOS; temporal logic; Lustre; ASA; ClawZ; Uppaal; lambda calculus; schedulability analysis; 
Time Petri Nets. 
Tools: Uppaal 
Modification Procedures Plan 
Synonyms: maintenance procedures plan 
Definition: Description of the instructions as to what to do when performing a modification in a critical system in order to 
make corrections, enhancements, or adaptations to the validated system, ensuring that the required safety is sustained [35].  
Techniques, tools and artefacts: changes propagation; non-regression testing; maintenance plan; inspection procedures; 
repair time; change assessment. 
Non-operational Testing Results 
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Definition: Results from evaluation of a critical system in an environment that does not correspond to but replicates its actual 
operational environment [1].  
Normal Range Testing Results 
Definition: Results from the verification of the behaviour of a system under normal operational conditions [13]. 
Techniques: Equivalence classes and input partitioning testing. 
Object Code 
Definition: Computer instructions and data definitions in a form output by an assembler or compiler [32]. 
Operation Procedures Plan 
Definition: Description of the instructions and manuals necessary to ensure that the safety targets of a critical system are 
maintained during its use [35]. 
Artefacts: user manual; target staff description; installation procedure; operational staff support description; installation 
structure plan; training plan; incident registration procedures; performance monitoring plan; installation and operation facility 
procedures; evacuation procedures; description of the allocation of system functions between equipment and operators. 
Operational Testing Results 
Definition: Results from the evaluation of a critical system in its actual operating environment [1]. 
Operator Competence Specification 
Definition: Specification of the skills or knowledge that the parties involved in the operation procedures need in order to 
carry out the activities assigned to them [35]. 
Techniques, tools and artefacts: operational staff training needs specification; manning requirements specification. 
Information: operator competence; user experience. 
Performance Testing Results 
Definition: Results from the verification of the performance requirements (e.g., capacity and response time) of a critical 
system [1]. 
Synonyms: resource consumption analysis. 
Techniques: memory use analysis; timing analysis; memory partitioning analysis. 
Information: memory use. 
Project Risk Management Plan 
Definition: Description of the activity regarding the development and documentation of an organised and comprehensive 
strategy for identifying project risks. It includes establishing methods for mitigating and tracking risk [9]. 
Reliability Testing Results 
Definition: Results from the verification of fault-free behaviour in a critical system [1]. 
Synonyms: failure analysis 
Techniques: statistical testing; probabilistic testing. 
Requirements Specification 
Definition: Specification of the external conditions and capabilities that a critical system must meet and possess, 
respectively, in order to (1) allow a user to solve a problem or achieve an objective, or (2) satisfy a contract, standard, 
specification, or other formally imposed documents [5][32]. 
Artefacts: (specifications of) performance requirements; derived requirements; software safety requirements; software 
requirements; high-level requirements; low-level requirements; functional requirements; interface requirements; safety 
requirements; failure requirements; monitoring requirements; software requirements; MMEL/CDL. 
Reused Component Specification 
Definition: Specification of the characteristics of an existing system that is (re-) used to make up a critical system [32]. 
Artefacts: reused component requirements specification; reused component functions specification; fault pattern library; 
reused component reliability specification; product safety accreditation; OS/RTOS certification; supplier information; reused 
component safety case; reused component safety analysis results; equipment requirements specification. 
Reused Component Historical Service Data Specification 
Definition: Specification of the dependability (often, reliability) of a component reused in a critical system based on past 
observation of the behaviour [35].  
Artefacts: field service experience; product service history; fault log; maintenance reports; studies and reviews of operation 
safety and environmental experience; maintenance records and surveys. 
Information: probability of failure on demand (from past behaviour); prior field reliability in similar applications; failure 
frequency; failure rate; MTTF; MTTR; MTBF. 
Review Results 
Definition: Description of a process or meeting during which a system lifecycle work product or set of works products is 
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presented to some interested party for comment or approval [32]. 
Synonyms: walkthrough (usually used to refer to a review led by a designer or programmer)  
Artefacts: (results from, usually reports of) source code walkthrough; independent audit review; source code review; design 
review. 
Risk Analysis Results 
Definition: Specification of the expected amount of danger when an identified hazard will be activated and thus become an 
accident in a critical system [9].  
Synonyms: risk assessment results 
Techniques: FTA; ETA; PHA; SHA; FMEA; FMECA; Markov Analysis; FMES; FPTC; FPTN; PHA; FMES; IHA; RASP; 
HRA. 
Information: likelihood, severity. 
Project Risk Management Plan 
Definition: Description of the activity regarding the development and documentation of an organised and comprehensive 
strategy for identifying project risks. It includes establishing methods for mitigating risk and for tracking risk [9]. 
Robustness Testing Results 
Definition: Results from the verification of the behaviour of a critical system in the presence of faulty situations in its 
environment [1].  
Techniques: fault injection testing; SWIFI; EMFI. 
Safety Management Plan 
Definition: Description of the coordinated, comprehensive set of processes designed to direct and control resources to 
optimally manage the safety of an operational aspect of an organisation [9]. 
Simulation Results 
Definition: Results from the verification of a critical system by creating a model that behaves or operates like the system 
when provided with a set of controlled inputs [32]. 
Techniques: symbolic execution; emulation; hardware-in-loop testing; animation 
Tools: Matlab/Simulink; TargetLink; Stateflow. 
Source Code 
Definition: Computer instructions and data definitions expressed in a form suitable for input to an assembler, compiler, or 
other translator [32]. 
Artefacts: ADA code; C code; C++ code. 
Stress Testing Results 
Definition: Results from the verification of the behaviour of a critical system at the maximum design load, as well as beyond 
it [1]. 
Techniques: boundary value testing; exhaustive input testing; sensitivity testing. 
Structural Coverage Testing Results 
Definition: Results from the verification of the behaviour of a critical system by executing all or a percentage of the 
statements or blocks of statements in a program, or specified combinations of them, according to some criteria [1]. 
Synonyms: structural coverage analysis. 
Techniques: MC/DC testing (or coverage); control flow analysis; data flow analysis; statement coverage; branch coverage; 
subroutines coverage; safety requirements coverage. 
Information: element under analysis; coverage percentage. 
System Historical Service Data Specification 
Definition: Specification of the dependability (often, reliability) of a system based on past (prior-certification) observation of 
the behaviour [35]. 
System Inception Specification 
Definition: Specification of initial details about the characteristics of a critical system and how it will be created [5][13]. 
Artefacts: PSAC; EUC specification; scoping document. 
Information: suitability of notations; soundness of methods; quality of development method. 
 
 
